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RIZAL G. BUENDIA∗ 
The continuing struggle of the Moro secessionist movement in the Philippines is one 
of Southeast Asia’s longest armed conflicts. The tenacity of the conflict lies in two 
competing concerns: the assertion of self-determination rights of the Moro separatist 
movement; and the affirmation of the Philippines’ sovereign right to territorial 
integrity. However, beneath these rights are crucial issues that remain unanswered 
both by the contending forces—problems where internecine violence and conflict 
emanate from. This article argues that self-determination rights can be adequately 
exercised by people who have clearly defined their national identity and concept of a 
nation. Unfortunately, the Moro multi-ethnic national identity has yet to be 
crystallized while the idea of a Bangsamoro (Bangsa Nation) remains weak. On the 
other hand, the state has yet to address the Moros’ legitimate demands of political 
autonomy, socio-economic development, and social justice and discrimination. 
Without underestimating the ethnic component of secessionism, the article concludes 
that poor governance has prolonged, complicated, and further justified the Moros’ 
quest to secede from the Republic. 
Introduction 
The Mindanao conflict, expressed in Muslim armed resistance against the Philippine 
state, has deep historical roots and resolution is definitely not easy. The armed 
conflict which has been fought under two competing banners of national self-
determination on the one hand, and protection of state rights on the other hand, has 
taken thousands of lives, destroyed millions worth of properties, and displaced a 
magnitude of people who sought refuge in other regions of the country as well as in 
neighboring countries. The territorial question has been disputed more often in the 
battlefields than over a negotiating table.  
The Muslim secessionists prefer to be called Moros1 rather than Filipinos. 
They believe that their people have never been part of the Philippines and their 
current struggle is a continuation of their ancestors’ war for independence, which was 
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first launched against Spanish and American rule, and presently under the post-
colonial “Filipino-run Philippine state.” On the other side, the state contends that the 
separatist movement has to acknowledge the existence of a sovereign Philippine state 
whose territorial jurisdiction has been defined in accordance with the international 
law. Hence, the state views the ongoing armed struggle of the Moros as an act of 
secession against a legitimate state while the former declares it an exercise of the 
people’s “right to self-determination” against a state which “illegitimately annexed” 
the Bangsamoro.2 
This article examines two competing perspectives in nation-state building 
espoused by the Muslim minorities and Philippine state. It traces both the historical 
antecedents and consequences of Moro-state conflict, the relevant and primary actors 
involved in the conflict as well as their motives and strategies in realizing their 
objectives, and the roots of the political violence. Towards the end of the article, a 
general assessment of the prospects of resolving the ongoing conflict is made. 
The article argues that the Moros self-determination struggle, without 
underestimating the ethnic content of the resistance movement, is triggered and drawn 
out more by the combined causes of state’s centralism that restrict their self-governing 
power, socio-economic grievances and deprivation, and perceived injustices, 
discrimination, and alienation of the people from the mainstream of Philippine 
political and economic development rather than an overarching movement with a 
single concept of a Bangsa Moro (Moro Nation). A Bangsa Moro consciousness and 
national unification among Philippine Muslims has yet to be achieved. The article 
concludes that the armed conflict between the Moros and the state is more of a 
contestation of democratic space where expansive and interactive governance can 
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function and thrive both for the minorities and majorities rather than a question of 
Moro national self-determination.  
Ethnogenesis of Moro and the Colonial State  
The term Moro was the appellation applied by the Portuguese, who seized Melaka in 
1511, to all Muslim population of Southeast Asia.3 It was the name used by the 
Spaniards to refer to Muslim inhabitants in the Philippines alluding to the Muslim 
Moorish occupation of the Iberian Peninsula and the northern coast of the African 
continent in 711 A.D. When the Spaniards crossed the Pacific Ocean and reached the 
Philippines in the sixteenth century, they encountered ferocious resistance from 
Muslims inhabiting the Southern Sultanates of the country. This reminded them of 
their ancient enemy, who aside from being Islamic, was hostile like the Moors. Thus 
the Philippine Muslims were called “Moros.”4  
The Muslims’ historical claim on Mindanao and Sulu as their homeland predates 
the Spanish colonization of the Philippines that began with the arrival of General 
Legazpi in 1565. About 200 years prior to colonial rule, local Islamic communities 
and settlements were already thriving in Sulu and Mindanao. There were three 
established sultanates—Jolo (seat of the first Muslim sultanate), Sulu, and 
Maguindanao—long before the Spaniards consolidated their control over the northern 
part of the Philippines. Trade and commerce by Muslim traders across the Malay 
regions and beyond were also flourishing.  
According to a 1573 Spanish record, three Muslim settlements in their nascent 
stage were found in Luzon.5 This signifies the rising influence of Islam in the country 
that could transform the entire archipelago into a Muslim nation similar to its 
neighboring countries. Clearly, Spanish colonialism in the sixteenth century aborted 
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the spread of Islamic proselytization activities and reversed the trajectory of Islamic 
diffusion in the country.  
As the Spanish monarchy claimed sovereign rule over most of the lands of the 
indios (from the word india, meaning “native”), it failed to claim sovereignty over the 
territories of the Moros. The Muslims offered a good fight to check the colonizer’s 
attempt to annex the Moro homeland under the Spanish Crown. While the wars 
between the Spaniards and indio conscripts on the one hand and the Muslims on the 
other hand were religious in character or had religious undertones, opposition to 
Spanish rule failed to transcend ethno-linguistic identities of native Muslims to a 
national and transcendental Moro identity comparable to the transformation of indio 
(Hispanized, subjugated, and Catholicized) into a Filipino national identity years 
before the spark of the 1896 Revolution.6 Historical evidence was patchy and 
insufficient to conclude that a Moro nation was created as a result of Muslim 
resistance against colonial rule. In fact, in spite of the considerable success of 
Muslims to repel the incursions of Spanish conquistadores, they were not able to rise 
above their limited ethno-linguistic identification.  
In a general sense, there was neither a unilateral nor single response to Spanish 
colonialism among Muslim communities.7 McKenna challenged the idea that 
aggressive Christianization precipitated a heightened Islamic consciousness and 
identity of the Muslims.8 A sense of “Moro-ness” among the Muslim populace cannot 
be attributed to the harsh and ruthless governance of the Spanish regime. It was 
during the less than half a century of American colonial regime rather than the more 
than three centuries of Spanish rule when Moro developed into a transcendent and 
self-conscious Philippine Muslim ethnic identify.  
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Najeeb Saleeby, one of the most influential thinkers in the early American 
colonial administration, expressed in his 1913 essay, The Moro Problem, that the 
various Muslim ethno-linguistic groups were in no sense united, nor possessed—
jointly or individually—a politically potent oppositional Islamic consciousness. 
Acknowledging the value of imparting a sense of collective development and 
common “destiny” among the Moros, Saleeby suggests that Moros be allowed to 
emulate a “superior” culture analogous to that devised by the Americans for Christian 
Filipinos. 
Moved by a natural tendency to imitate superior civilization, he would 
unconsciously reform his customs and home life and gradually acquire 
American ideas and new ambitions. An enlightened Moro community, wisely 
guided by efficient American officials, would undoubtedly work out its own 
destiny, and following the natural law of growth and development would 
gradually rise in wealth and culture to the level of a democratic municipality.9  
 
Saleeby laid down the colonial genesis of Morohood. Foremost was his campaign 
for a datu-led development and unification of the Philippine Muslims through the 
formation of a new transcendent Muslim identity—the transformation and fusion of 
Muslim ethnic identities into a single Moro identity. Second was to intensify and 
deepen people’s understanding as well as appreciation of Islam as their religion. And 
third, the precipitation of social osmosis to enable the Moros to acquire the level of 
economic and political development the Americans have bequeathed to Christian 
Filipinos.  
In spite of America’s fierce pacification operations in the Muslim south, that took 
longer and applied more cruel methods compared to the northern rebels, benevolence 
was also pronounced.10 The Muslims and other non-Christianized groups in the 
country were treated as “wards” of the nation who needed the state’s protection and 
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additional tutelage to bring about “their advancement into civilization and material 
prosperity.”11 As Abinales assays, a number of Muslims have made their relationship 
with Americans intimate and highly personal while more politically astute datus have 
established a long relationship with the new colonizers in the hope of soliciting 
political benefits.12  
Markedly, the promotion of American-type education and institutionalization of 
public school system in the entirety of the Philippines hastened the growth and 
formation of Muslim identity as Muslim Filipinos. Apart from the influence of 
American system of education that produced new Western-oriented and educated 
Muslim elite, the policy of secularization has led, to a significant degree, the 
rationalization of Muslim political system.  
In McKenna’s review of US policies towards the end of American rule, he says:  
… American colonial policies had the effect of ethnicizing Muslim identity 
in the Philippines. By “ethnicizing” Islam I mean to say that American 
colonial rulers encouraged the development of a self-conscious Philippine 
Muslim identity among a generation of educated Muslim elite who were 
otherwise divided by significant linguistic, geographic, and, to some extent, 
cultural barriers. … [a]s the term “Moro” remained a pejorative among 
Philippine Christians, the most common alternative denomination became 
“Muslim Filipino,” connoting a Muslim citizen of the new (or soon-to-be) 
Philippine nation.13  
 
Cognizant of the imminent granting of Philippine independence by the United 
States in 1946, Muslim politicians tried to project the image of a unified and 
revitalized populace in order to gain some power bases in a nation-state that will be 
controlled by Christian Filipinos. The amplification of a self-conscious transcendent 
identity as Philippine Muslims resulted not from their opposition to American 
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colonial rule but adherence to the objectives of western-defined development and 
ideals of secularism.  
The Search for Moro Identity and Nation-State  
The quest of Muslims of Mindanao to create their own sovereign state started when 
the entire Philippines was still a colony of the United States of America. Beginning in 
early 1920s, Muslim leaders of Sulu and Mindanao began a peaceful movement that 
asserted their right to establish their own nation-state and form a government of their 
choice. Leaders petitioned and offered two options for the US Congress to consider: 
join the Federal Government of the United States, or be declared a separate sovereign 
state from the would-be Republic of the Philippines.14 Being part of the Philippine 
state was not among their alternatives.  
The denial of their petition and inevitability of Philippine independence after an 
American sponsored 10-year transition period under a Commonwealth Republic led 
Muslim leaders to reconfigure their Moro identity in line with forthcoming Philippine 
nation-state. Muslim leaders declared themselves as “Filipinos” and considered 
Moro—pejoratively associated with piracy, savagery, slavery, treachery, amok 
(juramentado), and other negative connotations—as a name that is unacceptable.  
In the 1934 Constitutional Convention that framed the 1935 Philippine 
Constitution (used as the fundamental law of the Commonwealth and 1946 Republic 
of the Philippines), several elected Muslim Constitutional delegates, led by Alauya 
Alonto, called upon their fellow delegates not only to cease from calling Muslims as 
Moros but also to accept Muslims as part of the Filipino nation. Alonto of Lanao 
henceforth declared:  
We do not like to be called “Moros” because when we are called “Moros” we 
feel that we are not considered as part of the Filipino people… So that I 
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would like to request the members of this Convention that we prefer to be 
called “Mohammedan Filipinos” and not “Moros,” because if we are called 
“Moros” we will be considered as enemies [of the state] … 15 
 
The turn of events is a classic case of shifting self-definition, attaching new value 
and meaning to one’s identity in the prospect of advancing its political interests and 
exigencies of power within the parameters of a newfound state.  
The intensification of ethnicized Muslim identity continued after the Americans 
left. Although Islamic education from early 1950s until late 1960s was geared 
towards the deepening of Muslim consciousness, it underscored the value of “good 
citizenship” and emphasized the importance of political participation of Muslims in 
the affairs of the Philippine Republic. Domocao Alonto of Lanao, a Muslim member 
of the House of Representatives, proclaimed before the First National Muslim 
Convention in 1955: “We need a thorough spiritual rejuvenation … If we are good 
Muslims, we are automatically good citizens.”16  
What deepened in almost two decades from the 1950s was the ethnic self-
recognition of the masses as Filipino-Muslims (foremost as a Filipino and second, as a 
Muslim). The legitimacy of the Philippine state to govern the Muslim areas of the 
country was neither questioned nor challenged by any of the Muslim elite.  
From unity to disunity 
 
In late 1960s until early 1970s, a string of political events transpired that triggered the 
re-invention of Muslim identity. The emergence of new intellectuals and counter-elite 
among the Muslims revived the independence movement of the 1920s, momentarily 
suspended by the 1946 Philippine independence. 
The violence of the state in the infamous Corregidor Jabidah massacre on 18 
March 1968, 17 almost 50 years after the peaceful clamor for independence, re-sparked 
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the issue of Muslim sovereignty, this time through war. The massacre, otherwise 
known as the “Corregidor Incident,” took place when 28 out of less than 200 Muslim 
military trainees (called “Jabidah commandos”), mostly Tausug and Sama from Sulu 
and Tawi-Tawi, were summarily executed in Corregidor Island.18 Notwithstanding a 
few Senate and Congressional hearings on the issue, no one was arrested and held 
responsible for the ghastly massacre.19  
The Jabidah massacre was perceived as the state’s assault against Muslims who 
offered their services to the Republic, but had been duped, subjugated, and 
perfidiously murdered by Christians acting on behalf of the state. Both Muslim 
political elite and traditional leaders have experienced the contradictions in their 
hyphenated identity and felt the frustrations in their bid to be integrated in the body 
politic.  
The tragedy gave birth to the Muslim (later renamed Mindanao) Independence 
Movement (MIM) led by Datu Udtog Matalam, then Governor of Cotabato province 
(the biggest in the country at that time). Matalam’s call for “secession” came in the 
wake of political violence in Cotabato that was then beginning to take shape as a 
Muslim-Christian conflict.20 However, he relinquished his idea of secession soon after 
then President Marcos co-opted him and later became the Presidential Adviser on 
Muslim Affairs.  
Other Muslim politicians and traditional leaders came together to continue what 
Matalam had given up. Then member of the House of Representatives, Raschid 
Lucman formed the Bangsa Moro Liberation Organization (BMLO) in 1971 but later 
dropped the name Moro, which remains unacceptable to many of the Muslims, and 
adopted Bangsa Muslimin Islamic Liberation Organization (BMILO) instead in 
1984.21 Generally composed of Maranao ethnic group, the BMILO was conceived to 
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be the umbrella organization of all Muslim liberation forces.22 The BMILO braced 
itself for a protracted armed confrontation with the state in pursuit of its goal to craft a 
separate Muslim state from the Philippines. Towards this effort, several batches of 
Muslims participated in a series of military training conducted in Sabah, Malaysia 
Among those who belong to the first batch, known as the “Top 90,” were Nur Misuari 
and Salamat Hashim.23  
Nevertheless, the BMILO was not able to sustain itself as an alternative to MIM 
when some of its key leaders tried to negotiate with then President Marcos for Muslim 
Mindanao’s political autonomy. This was perceived by the younger and more militant 
BMILO members as a sign of capitulation. The frustration and disgust caused by the 
leadership, by and large composed of Muslim politicians and traditional elite of 
Muslim society, led Misuari and Hashim together with a number of young 
intellectuals of the BMILO to bolt out of the organization and eventually established 
the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF).  
Gaining lessons from the past Muslim independence movement beginning in the 
1920s, Misuari assessed that the failures of previous movements were not wholly 
rooted in the callousness of the state in its treatment of Muslim minorities and 
discriminatory policies that favor the Christian majority but also partly caused by the 
“collaboration” of their own Muslim leaders with the Manila “politico-economic 
elite.” Misuari sets him apart from the rest of the Muslim organizations. He conceived 
a rebellion that has two fundamental objectives: to set up a single independent 
homeland covering the 13 ethno-linguistic Muslim groupings in the Philippines;24 and 
to wage war against Muslim traditional politicians and aristocratic leaders who 
cooperated with the state.25  
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Misuari’s vision of a secessionist war was emphatically secular in orientation 
rather than Islamic. It is neither ethnic nor religious. Its goal is to reclaim the Bangsa 
Moro (Moro Nation), the Muslims’ homeland, that has been “unjustifiably annexed 
by the Philippine state.” He called upon his brethren to renounce their identities as 
Filipino-Muslims and declare their identity and nationality as “Moro,” a reincarnation 
of the pre-colonial identity as the descendants of the “unsubjugated” and 
“uncolonised” peoples. What looked to be the state’s prejudices against the Muslims 
had found a national expression. As Ernest Gellner says, it is more advantageous to 
set up a “rival nation” when entry into the dominant nation is difficult if not 
impossible.26 
The maiden issue of MNLF’s clandestine newsletter, Mahardika, stipulates the 
meaning of Moro identity and character of Moro struggle. It is national in scope and 
covers what it imagines to be the confines of the Bangsa Moro—neither ethnic nor 
religious. 
From this very moment, there shall be no stressing the fact that one is a 
Tausug, a Samal, a Yakan, a Subanon, a Kalagan, a Maguindanao, a Maranao 
or a Badjao. He is only a Moro. Indeed, even those of other faith [sic] who 
have long established residence in the Bangsa Moro homeland and whose 
good-will and sympathy are with the Bangsa Moro Revolution shall, for 
purposes of national identification, be considered Moros. In other words, the 
term Moro is a national concept that must be understood as all embracing for 
all Bangsa Moro people within the length and breadth of our national 
boundaries.27  
 
In retrospect, Misuari transformed the epithet “Moro” into a positive identity of 
the Muslims and symbol of unity and pride in the course of national resistance against 
the Philippine state. The ethnicizing of Muslim identity was a consequence of the 
awakening of Muslim self-consciousness.  
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The Bangsamoro struggle is an expression of a “reactive nationalism,” articulated 
by the new and non-traditional counter-elite on a reactive basis, and resonates with 
Muslim society which is undergoing some “crisis of self-confidence.” It demonizes 
the threats of the state as the enemy and mobilizes the masses to take collection action 
against such threats. It has to appeal to an educated Muslim middle class and is 
invariably populist, intended to induct the masses into politics.  
Misuari led the MNLF of about 65,000 armed regulars for 30 years in war and 
peace. The Bangsamoro independence movement was nonetheless saddled with 
leadership crisis and power struggles. The question of Moro unification has been the 
overriding concern both of the Muslims and movement’s sponsors like the 
Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC),28 the Muslim World League (MWL), and 
the Muslim World Congress (MWC). 
In 34 years from the time the MNLF was established in 1971,29 the movement 
suffered four organizational fissures, a clash over leadership occurred every over eight 
years on the average. Currently, there are four Moro organizations (varying in size 
and prominence) advancing the issue of self-determination in different forms and 
adopting dissimilar strategies. A fifth organization just emerged recently, in February 
2005, and engaged the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) in a running battle in 
Sulu group of islands.  
The first split took place as early as 1977, a year after the MNLF and the 
Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) forged the GRP-MNLF Tripoli 
Agreement.30 Salamat Hashim (a leading member of MNLF Central Committee), a 
devout Muslim Maguindanaoan, broke ties with the MNLF and formed the “New 
MNLF” which advocated for autonomy rather than independence. Hashim projected 
his newfound organization as a reformist party that can deal with the government 
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better than the MNLF. When the OIC maintained its backing to the MNLF, the New 
MNLF changed its name to Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in 1984, and made 
Islam as its official ideology. Hashim challenged Misuari, a secular and nationalist, as 
the rightful leader of the Bangsamoro. He chaired the MILF until his death on 13 July 
2003.  
The MILF’s armed force, the Bangsa Moro Islamic Armed Forces (BIAF), has 
about 120,000 fighters (80 percent are armed) and 300,000 militiamen in late 1990s.31 
Even though the AFP puts the MILF strength to be between 8,000 and 15,000, it does 
not deny that rebels ranks swelled by 14 percent in the first six months of 1999 and 11 
percent in terms of firearms in the same period. MILF’s military might has seriously 
confronted government forces in Mindanao from the time the MNLF became part of 
the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) 32 in 1996 in line with the 
provisions of the GRP-MNLF Final Peace Agreement (FPA).33  
The second split happened in 1991, two years after the creation of the ARMM in 
1989, with the founding of the Abu Sayyaf (“sword bearer”) Group or ASG by 
Abdurajak Janjalani. Like Hashim, Janjalani was a pious leader who studied Islamic 
law in Saudi Arabia but more radical compared with Hashim. He received his military 
training in Libya and fought in the 1979–1989 Afghanistan war against the Russian 
invasion. He was later killed in an encounter with policemen in 1998 and ASG’s 
leadership was assumed by his brother, Khadaffy Janjalani (thought to be the titular 
head). While the ASG shares the same disillusionment with the MILF with regards to 
MNLF’s cooperation with the government, it nonetheless differs with the MILF in its 
vision of an Islamic state and the manner it can be realized. The ASG advocates the 
creation of a “purely Islamic government” through “Jihad Fi-Sabil-lillah” (Islamic 
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war) to end “oppression, injustice, capricious ambitions, and arbitrary claims impose 
on the Muslims.”34  
Mainly composed of young and disgruntled elements of MNLF and MILF and 
largely composed of Tausug and Sama ethnic groups of the Muslim community, its 
military strength is estimated between 300 and 1,000 armed guerrillas with roughly 
400 firearms.35 It has been known for its hostage-taking and kidnapping for ransom, 
robberies, beheadings, and other ghastly acts that victimized both Muslim and 
Christian civilians. The MNLF and MILF view the ASG with consternation and 
dismay. The MNLF had given tacit support to the AFP military action against the 
ASG while the MILF renounces its activities and calls it a group of bandits that have 
given Islam a bad name.36 The U.S. and Philippine governments have classified the 
ASG as a “terrorist organisation” and pursue a policy of “search and destroy” without 
any inclination of forging a peace agreement. 
The third faction was formed in the early months of 1995, prior to the conclusion 
of the 1996 peace accord between the GRP and MNLF. Known as the National 
Islamic Command Council (NICC), under the leadership of Melham Alam (former 
chief of staff of Misuari), it claims to have nearly 90 percent of the original 20,000-
25,000 MNLF forces. The military, however, estimates its membership to few 
hundreds. In a press conference held in March 2000, it announced that the guerrilla 
war against the Philippine government would continue and accused Misuari as a 
collaborator of the Christian state and a traitor to the Bangsamoro liberation struggle. 
The NICC further pronounced the establishment of an independent Islamic state in 
Mindanao through “mutual destruction.” Given the relative similarity between 
NICC’s and ASG’s belief and mode of struggle, there is a strong indication that both 
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of them have been working either collectively or separately in staging terrorist acts 
against Christian and Muslim civilians masquerading as political engagements.  
The fourth fracture came seven months before the ARMM election in November 
2001. Led by his comrade-in-arms in the MNLF and ARMM, calling themselves as 
the “Council of 15,” 37 Misuari was declared as “incompetent” to remain as MNLF’s 
Chairman and euphemistically elevating him as “Chairman Emeritus” instead. This 
effectively rendered him powerless. Through a resolution it issued on 29 April 2001, 
the Council proclaimed itself as the legitimate Central Committee of the MNLF.38 
This was eventually acknowledged by the Philippine government and OIC’s 10th 
Summit Meeting on 15 October 2003 held in Putrajaya, Malaysia as the sole 
“representative of Muslim community in the Philippines.”39  
Likewise, Misuari was ousted as ARMM Governor and Chair of the Southern 
Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD)40 which he jointly held for 
five years (1996–2001). Following his expulsion, Misuari was incarcerated on charges 
of sedition41 and corruption42 filed against him in court by the government. The 
“Council of 15” had consolidated its power with the election of Parouk Hussin, 
former Foreign Affairs Committee Chair of Misuari and one of the leaders of the 
“Council,” as the new regional governor in November 2001, notwithstanding the 
political and financial support of the national government in the electoral campaign. 
Hussin serves as governor under the new ARMM’s Organic Act (Republic Act 
9054).43  
The fifth group surfaced in February 2005. The military named it as “Misuari 
Breakaway Group” (MBG) or “MNLF renegades,” to distinguish it from the 
“mainstream MNLF” which had been part of government in 1996. It was tagged as an 
assemblage of terrorists linked to the ASG. Contrary to what the military claimed that 
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the group demanded the speedy and fair trial of Misuari who was imprisoned under 
charges of treason and corruption, its spokesperson, Ustadz Habier Malik, cited AFP’s 
atrocities in Sulu as the main triggering factor for the uprising. The Misuari factor or 
loyalty to any individual never figured as the cause in the most recent violence in 
Mindanao.44  
Factionalism in the Bangsamoro struggle, either among and between traditional 
political elite or new intellectual and counter-elite, has not only hobbled the quest of 
the Moros towards achieving their goal but more importantly, highlighted the 
fundamental and continuing question of Moro identity and Moro national unity. From 
Matalam’s MIM to Hashim’s MILF, Muslim minorities find it difficult to unite under 
one self-identifying and all-inclusive banner. As a consequence of constant divisions 
and splitting up of leaders in the Moro movement, the process of ethnicizing Moro 
identity as a nationality has been stunted and is a reflection of a crisis in self-
definition.  
The continuing formation of Moro identity and national unity  
 
Although heads of organizations refer to the same “national past,” the “national 
future” is indeterminate and blurred. The internecine debate over the concept of a 
Bangsa Moro and strategy in achieving the vision of a separate state is far from being 
resolved. The Moros speak of different Bangsas. The erstwhile secessionist MNLF 
says the Bangsa covers the 13 provinces and nine cities in Mindano, Palawan, Sulu, 
Basilan, and Tawi-Tawi, while the MILF declares that it shall comprise the 
geographical areas dominated by the Muslims (six provinces [Maguindanao, Lanao 
del Sur, Lanao del Norte, Basilan, Tawi-Tawi, Sultan Kudarat] and the city of 
Marawi). This shall constitute domain of the future Moro nation-state. The ASG and 
other splinter groups have nebulous concept of Bangsa Moro. In other words, there is 
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no single idea of a Bangsa Moro among the Muslims asserting their right to self-
determination. Apparently, the notion of a Moro Nation is constricted by their 
assorted political and organizational agenda. 
Moreover, ruptures in the Bangsamoro movement occur whenever the state 
accommodates some of the political demands or acquiesces partly to certain 
grievances advance by a particular Moro revolutionary organization. It appears that 
the shifting loyalties and interests of leaders as well as their respective organizational 
strategies and tactics is more of a response to the vagaries of political priorities and 
constraints which the state presents.  
It is also instructive to note that the three major rebel fronts that contested state’s 
power since the Jabidah massacre of 1968 correspond to the three main ethnic groups 
among more than a dozen of Muslim ethno-linguistic groupings. The BMILO was 
generally composed of the Maranaos, the MNLF by the Tausugs, and the MILF by 
the Maguindanaos. It was also reported that Moro rebels prefer to fight with their 
fellow ethnic groups, e.g., Maranaos, Tausugs, and Maguindanaos, rather than to be 
with ethnic groups other than their own.45 This does not connote however that feeling 
of enmity and hostility exists between ethnic groups. 
Similarly, there is no convincing proof that links the organizational split among 
rebel groups to inter-ethnic competition or animosity. The fact remains that both 
MNLF and MILF to date are composed of Moro multi-ethnic fighters who are 
generally united in pursuing their particular organizational objectives rather than 
divided by internecine ethnic identities. Nevertheless, there is ample confirmation to 
suggest that both organizations shift their strategies and tactics based on the 
configuration of state and character of regime that interacts with them.  
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Indeed, the “national character” of the Moro struggle has yet to be strengthened. 
Its weakness is portrayed not only in terms of the Moros historical difficulty to stand 
as one people united under a single leadership that effectively engages the state into a 
vision of self-governance but also in categorically defining and qualifying the national 
identity of people. Moro identity is far from dense and vulnerable to political 
manipulation either by the state or non-state actors as witnessed by the formation of 
innumerable groups, some of them involved in criminal activities, using “Islam” as 
their protective shield. 
In spite of the aforesaid infirmity in Moro’s identity, affinity with Muslims 
(regardless of ethno-linguistic grouping) has persisted. Identities have not dissolved 
and primordial interests have been sustained. They were seldom surrendered to the 
imposing power of the Philippine state. Ethnic ties have emotional, psychological, and 
religious depths that are not easily severed. These are human ontological factors 
which cannot be subjected to authoritative controls; thus, no amount of coercion or 
repression can contain Moros aspirations to self-determination in an extended period 
of time.  
The dual dimension of Moro identity indicates its strength and weakness. While 
Moros have not transcended their innate ethno-linguistic identity, this has not 
prevented them to work and relate with other ethnic groups amicably—both Muslim 
and Christian. This is attested by the presence of Christians and Muslim converts in 
several armed and unarmed Moro organizations. The cultural boundary has been 
permeable and spongy. On the other hand, the less than orthodox practice of Islam 
among Filipino Muslims,46 in contrast to Muslims of Middle Eastern countries, gives 
the Moros the opportunity to deepen their sense of oneness and nationhood through a 
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more tolerant manner and process of consultation and consensus with other competing 
Moro revolutionary organizations. 
 
The State and Moro Right to Self-Determination  
In spite of the inability of Muslims to transcend their ethnic identities in peace and 
war, the quest towards building a Moro nation-state continues. Saleeby’s observation 
on the issue of Muslim unity in the early years of American colonization and 
Misuari’s effort to ethnicize Moro identity in the late 1960s and early 1970s have not 
been translated into reality. Nonetheless, as the stringent objective conditions of 
nationhood have yet to be met, the vision and subjective notion of creating a Bangsa 
Moro kindles in the minds and hearts of Philippine Muslims. 
In the process of realizing the so-called Bangsa Moro Republik, amidst the 
arduous task of surmounting and raising ethnic identities and loyalties to a level of 
Moro national consciousness, the MILF continuous to be and now the most potent 
armed organization in carrying out the Moro secessionist movement. The government 
has acknowledged the armed capability of its forces to threaten the territorial integrity 
of the state after the MNLF acceded to political autonomy as defined in the Philippine 
1987 Constitution (Sections 15–21, Article X). Such recognition prompted it to 
initiate and commence the process of forging a peace accord with the MILF, 
beginning with informal negotiations, even before the conclusion of the 1996 GRP-
MNLF FPA.  
On 18 July 1997, then President Ramos was successful enough to bring the MILF 
to the negotiation table. The GRP-MILF Agreement for the General Cessation of 
Hostilities (AGCH) was signed but failed to yield any substantial results. Armed 
hostilities between government and MILF forces intensified under then President 
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Estrada’s “All Out War” policy against the MILF in April 2000 and completely 
disregarded even the 1998 General Framework of the Agreement of Intent (GFAI)47 
between GRP and MILF peace panels inked under his own administration.  
Seven years after the signing of the AGCH, now under President Arroyo, the 
GRP-MILF negotiations, though resumed in 2001 through the signing of the General 
Framework for the Resumption of Peace in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, have yet to be 
concluded. The Tripoli Agreement of Peace of 200148 that defined three major agenda 
items of security, rehabilitation, and ancestral domain has been limited to exploratory 
talks rather than on the discussion on the aforesaid agenda.49 Likewise, the GRP-
MILF Peace Talks in 2003 have not been too fruitful. Negotiations have been entirely 
focused on making ceasefire agreements more respectable and implementable as these 
have oftentimes been breached rather than applied. Generally, the peace talks have 
been highly volatile, tenuous, and insubstantial; limited to ceasefire agreements and 
presently the process had run longer than the 1992–1996 GRP-MNLF talks. 
In 2004, attempts were again made to contain armed clashes between the GRP 
and MILF forces to enable both panels to commence the discussion on the more 
substantive issues behind the 26 years of MILF secessionist struggle. In spite of the 
pronouncement of government in late August 2004 that the GRP-MILF peace 
negotiations are on track,50 armed conflict has yet to cease considerably.  
On the part of the Philippine state, the defense and preservation of its territorial 
integrity at all costs (armed and unarmed) persists as its primordial interest. Gaining 
the support of the OIC, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and 
presumably, the United Nations, the Philippines maintained that any attempts that will 
alter the country’s political and geographical jurisdiction will have to be done within 
the constitutional framework and processes of the country. Hence, MILF’s ultimate 
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agenda to secede, as what the MNLF began in 1971, is a non-negotiable subject in the 
GRP-MILF peace talks.  
On the other hand, while the MILF recognizes peace negotiations as the only 
“peaceful, civilized, and democratic way of solving the Bangsamoro problem,”51 it 
repeatedly emphasizes that independence should be the main agenda and framework 
for the formal talks. “There is no point to proceed if the negotiations will not lead to 
independence,” declared the MILF negotiators. The late MILF Chairman Hashim 
believed that what the GRP-MNLF FPA resolved was the government’s problem and 
not the Bangsamoro problem, “the agreement never touched the core of the 
Bangsamoro problem which is the illegal and immoral usurpation of their (referring to 
the Moros) ancestral homeland and legitimate rights to freedom and self-
determination”.52 Hashim’s successor, Al Haj Murad, also expressed in a message on 
the occasion of the fasting month of Ramadhan in November 2003, that “there can be 
no genuine peace and development unless the right of the Bangsamoro people to self-
determination is adequately addressed.”53  
What makes the right of self-determination so difficult to clarify is that its 
exercise involves a clash of fundamental world order principles. On the one side is the 
principle of upholding the territorial sanctity of existing states. On the other side is the 
sense that peoples have the right to statehood. Articles 1 (2) and 55 of the United 
Nations Charter have embodied the principle of self-determination as one of its 
guiding philosophies. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) pursued 
the issue further by stating that self-determination is not simply a principle but a right 
of everyone to “liberty.” The International Covenants on Human Rights—The 
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)—specifically provide in 
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Article 1 of each that “All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of 
that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, 
social and cultural development.”54  
However the adoption of the 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence 
to Colonial Countries and Peoples (DGICCP) in the form of a General Assembly 
Resolution is instructive. It confirms the right of self-determination in relation to 
colonialism and denies some forms of the right’s wider application. Evidently, it 
appreciates the inevitable tension between the exercise of the right to self-
determination and the parallel set of rights associated with territorial integrity of 
existing and emerging sovereign states. Thus, it reiterates Article 1 of the ICESCR 
and ICCPR in its Operative Provision 2 but at the same time qualifies such right in its 
Provision 6 which reads: “Any attempt at the partial or total disruption of the 
national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the 
purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.”55  
Provision 6 of the DGICCP culminated in the adoption of the influential 
Declaration of Principles Concerning Friendly Relations Among States (DPFRS) in 
1970 as United Nation’s General Assembly Resolution 2625. The resolution accepted 
the principle of the right of self-determination that is linked to the notion of “equal 
rights of peoples” but cautioned that the right shall not be construed as 
 
authorising or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, 
totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and 
independent States conducting themselves in compliance wit the principle of 
equal rights and self-determination of peoples … and thus possessed of a 
government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without 
distinction as to race, creed or colour.56  
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The assurance of territorial unity is now made contingent on the government 
being representative of the whole people and non-discriminatory in relation to “race, 
creed, or colour” and full right of self-determination (including secession) pertains 
only in colonial situations.  
In the international law literature on self-determination, two main views are 
pulling in opposite directions. The first tendency is the more restrictive view which 
limits the exercise of the right of self-determination within the confines of the 
territorial jurisdiction of existing states; the right cannot be invoked if the territorial 
unity of the state will be transgressed. The second view is expansionary which 
acknowledges and, to varying degrees, validates recent state-busting practice in a 
reformulated legal approach that admits that the character and scope of the right are 
more unsettled than ever. This latter view takes due note of the degree to which non-
sovereign territories of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia were given 
diplomatic recognition and admitted to the UN as sovereign states.  
The controversy on the principle and right of self-determination has led peoples 
and states to armed conflict. Struggles for autonomy and secession on the defense of 
peoples’ national rights are politically and militarily confronted by the state, invoking 
its right to protect the inviolability of its territory. Peoples of the world are told they 
have the right to self-determination. Nevertheless, if this right is suppressed by a 
sovereign state, the international community supports territorial integrity until a war 
of independence is successful. As in the past, the entire problem is settled on the 
battlefield. The conflict has been the source of tremendous human suffering and 
destruction in Asia, Africa, and Europe  
By and large, the conflict behind self-determination struggles is fundamentally a 
question of territorial rights. In war and peace, the issue of one’s control over a 
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physical space has been the persistent bone of contention between the Philippine state 
and the Bangsamo independence movement. In an effort to pursue the “self-
determination” agenda in the GRP-MILF peace talks, the MILF pushes its concern 
over ancestral domain. It hopes that government’s recognition of the right of the 
Bangsamoro over their ancestral domain will eventually result to the 
acknowledgement of Moros’ territory. “We just want a physical space where we can 
freely practice our religion and apply our ways of life. There is no need to seize 
power,” says MILF Information Chief, Mohagher Iqbal.57  
Indeed, the linkage between Moro identity and territory is intricately intertwined. 
Poulantzas, emphasizing the importance of territory to the notion of group 
self-identity, refers to the “historicity of a territory and territorialization of a 
history”—a territorial tradition concretized in the homeland.58 Therefore, a territory 
by itself is a human construct which serves as the material basis in defining and 
re-defining human, group, ethnic, and social relations. It is the source of one’s social 
security, assistance, dependency, sociability, and intimacy. It assures the continuity of 
culture and endurance of collective memory of peoples. As such, the concepts of 
space and territory are of extreme importance in ensuring the tenacity of one’s 
identity and survival as a people. 
The absence of or restriction to such control may invariably threaten the 
fulfillment of the peoples’ rights and imperil their identity to a particular territory. In 
this respect, the anxiety of the Bangsamoro over the future of their homeland simply 
infers their lack of full control over their lives. The right of a group with a distinctive 
politico-territorial identity to determine its own destiny is the political translation of 
aspirations in the demands for self-determination. Judge Hardy Dillard of the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ), writing in a separate opinion on the Western 
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Sahara Case, says that: “It is for the people to determine the destiny of the territory 
and not the territory the destiny of the people.”59  
One of the most vital reasons in exercising control over a piece of territory is that 
it reifies power. Tillich points out: 
 
Being means having space or, more exactly, providing space for oneself. 
This is the reason for the tremendous importance of geographical space and 
the fight for its possession by power groups. The struggle is not simply an 
attempt to remove another group from a given space. The real purpose is to 
draw this space into a larger power field, to deprive it of a centre of its own.60  
 
In as much as ethnic identity is, above all other things, territorial identity, the 
issue of Bangsamoro homeland has been the crux of the MILF’s self-determination 
struggle. In fact, the subject of ancestral domain will be the main agenda in the next 
round of discussion in late 2005 between the GRP and MILF negotiating panels. This 
would likely be a thorny issue and could lead to another stalemate.  
At the onset, the government perceives the question of ancestral domain within 
the bounds of the 1997 law: the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act (IPRA) or Republic 
Act 8371. IPRA seeks to recognize, protect and promote the right of indigenous 
peoples and cultural communities including Muslims, to claim ownership over their 
ancestral domain pursuant to the 1987 Constitution. It hinges on the concept of 
stewardship or the right of indigenous peoples to be the guardians and custodians of 
the earth. The law further sustains the Regalian Doctrine—affirmation of the state’s 
ultimate right to own, develop, and utilize all lands and resources under its political 
jurisdiction as enshrined in Section 2, Article 12 of the Constitution. By invoking the 
inherent power of the state to eminent domain, it reserves its right to have the last 
word on ancestral domains. 
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In contrast, the MILF works within the notion that the right over their ancestral 
domain is none other than the right to their homeland—the Bangsamoro territory, 
believed to have been “illegally annexed by the state.” It is not only about claims and 
rights to obtain ancestral domain titles as what the IPRA promises, but the right to 
self-determination and a correction of historical injustices.  
The MILF regards ancestral domain as the issue, which could give substance to 
the self-determination struggle. The government, on the other hand, considers it a 
question that can be answered within the bounds of the state’s power and authority. 
The differences of perspectives and frameworks of mind in viewing the issue of 
ancestral domain could be a tough concern in the upcoming negotiations but not 
necessarily insurmountable.  
 
Beyond National Self-Determination: Examining the Moro-State 
Conflict 
 
The contradiction between the state’s nation-building project and the secessionist 
movement’s state-creation venture has not only led to armed conflict but also tested 
the viability and competency of the current Philippine political system in unifying the 
country given the diversity of its people. Thus, beyond the issue of self-determination, 
a crucial element that contributes to the mitigation or exacerbation of the current 
conflict is the manner the state governs. 
In Kofi Annan’s address to the UN General Assembly in 1999, the Secretary-
General probed on the right of any state to hide behind sovereignty while committing 
flagrant violations of human rights. He argued that “the state is now widely 
understood to be the servant of its people—and not vice versa.” Invoking the UN 
Charter, Annan called upon states to protect and safeguard human rights and 
fundamental freedoms of each and every citizen.61 Interestingly, in 1997, Prince Hans 
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Adam II of Liechtenstein presented a similar standpoint in his exposé “Democracy 
and Self-Determination,” where he made the case that the state should principally 
offer services to its citizens; they in turn should have the right to “choose their states 
and citizenship freely—in self-determination.”62  
Against this backdrop, it is worth examining self-determination from the 
perspective of individual or group quests for human rights and better governance 
rather than a collective struggle for national independence. In other words, the search 
for a nation-state that is more responsive and relevant to the needs of people who are 
culturally distinct from the others, oftentimes the majority, is contingent more 
importantly on the character, ability, and capacity of the state to make itself a “servant 
of its people” rather than simply a ruler of its people. The so-called “internal’ 
dimension of self-determination, as what Prince Hans Adam II alludes to, is as 
essential as to the right to one’s statehood.  
In as much as peoples’ right to “internal” self-determination is hinged on the 
legitimate claim of the minorities to cultural and political autonomy, it becomes 
imperative that the grounds and sources where such demand springs from be 
analyzed. This part of the article is thus intended to assess the deep-seated causes of 
the Moros’ self-determination struggle.  
Without underrating the ethno-religious grounds of secessionism, it is contended 
that the separatist movement in Mindanao has been prolonged because of three major 
causes. First, the low degree of political autonomy which would enable Muslims to 
protect, safeguard, and defend their culture, identity, language, ways of life, and 
religion. Second, the inability of the state to adequately meet the basic socio-
economic needs of the Muslim community. Third, the widespread belief among 
Muslims that they have been victims of the state’s systematic socio-cultural 
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discrimination and politico-economic exploitation, an impression that has been 
reflected in the present-day economic, political, and social marginalization of the 
people.  
Low degree of political autonomy 
Under the unitary governmental structure, the so-called “autonomy” enjoyed by the 
ARMM has been historically an illusion. Devolution of powers manifests itself in the 
formal powers or administrative arrangements that are purportedly decentralized but 
politically controlled or influenced by the central government. In spite of the 
pronouncement that the government promotes “unity through diversity,” policies have 
been centrally formulated and conceived with less regard to the heterogeneous 
requirements, needs, and demands of local communities especially the minority 
peoples. They have been historically discriminated partially or totally in terms of the 
quality public services and goods received, degree of affinity to the country, and the 
amount the concern manifested by the national government to their plight.  
The present political governance structure has not only rendered the Moros and 
other minority groups powerless but also excluded them as part of the Filipino nation. 
The lack of power sharing due to the concentration of political powers on the few 
ruling elite either from the central government in Manila or Mindanao’s regional 
administrative centers has been a constant source of discontentment and frustration of 
people in the periphery. The increased despair, misery, and frustration especially for 
those people in the most marginalized communities and regions in Mindanao have 
fuelled armed uprisings. 
The assimilationist policy has been manifested through the centralism exercised 
by the state in the post-colonial period by means of its strategies such as: the emphasis 
on center-oriented allocation of resources; center-oriented administrative system 
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whereby the government exerts control over all other parts of the country, including 
the peripheral areas inhabited by ethnic groups; and provision of regional and local 
autonomy which allows peripheral areas to govern themselves and participate in the 
decision-making at the centre in accordance with the government's pre-defined rules 
and procedures. Such policy, however, has been seen as inappropriate and resisted by 
those groups who do not see themselves as part of the nation thereby felt strongly 
against the erosion of their self-identity and sensed it as a gross violation of their 
political and economic rights.  
Democracies, as well as governmental structures have to tolerate the widest 
possible diversity so long as the political system remains in equilibrium. In a similar 
vein, constitutional framework and development strategies apropos of fostering 
cultural pluralism have to be discovered sui generis in each case. In all respects, it 
becomes evident that building a nation in a multi-ethnic society through the 
centralized power of the state will simply result to internecine conflicts. 
Nation-building thus requires the empowerment of diverse ethnic communities and 
recognition of their right to nurture their own development as defined by their culture 
rather than by the state. 
The failures of the ARMM and previous “autonomous regions” created in 197763 
to empower and uplift the living conditions of the Muslims have made MILF less 
optimistic. Arroyo’s proposal for a more “enhanced, expanded, and strengthened 
autonomy” under the draft GRP-MILF Final Peace Agreement was shrugged off. It is 
a “tired phrase” states Michael Mastura, one of the members of the MILF negotiating 
panel.64 Aquilino Pimentel, a senator from Mindanao says that the “proposed peace 
pact tries to deal with the effects, not the causes, of the war in Mindanao.”65 He then 
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suggests a federal structure of government to address the problem of the BangsaMoro 
rebellion and bring a lasting peace in Mindanao.  
As a consequence of the top-down approach in development, Mindanao’s 
economic growth path has been altered minimally throughout the post-colonial years. 
Its economic performance since the country’s independence has always been 
relegated to the role of being an agricultural products supplier, typifying the classic 
dependency function of being the satellite of the country's major urban and 
metropolitan centers. It has the least access to basic services and infrastructure and 
has the highest and constant incidence of poverty as the following section shows. 
Socio-economic deprivation  
The centralizing power of the state also failed to uplift the socio-economic and health 
conditions of the Muslims. While Mindanao is rich in natural and human resources,66 
the people languish in destitution and suffer from the quagmire of poverty.  
After more than a quarter of a century of Philippine government claims to be 
“developing” Mindanao, national statistics illustrate the sad reality. Among the 16 
administrative regions, ARMM registered the poorest. In 1991, 1994, 1997, and 2000, 
poverty incidence (proportion of individuals whose annual income fall below the 
annual per capita) was registered at 56, 65, 64, and 63 percent respectively while 
national average was placed at 41 percent covering the years 1991 and 1994; 33 
percent in 1997 and 34 percent in 2000.67 Likewise, out of 81 provinces in the 
country, Muslim dominated provinces of Sulu, Tawi, Maguindanao, Lanao del, Sur, 
and Sultan Kudarat were among the poorest in 1997 and 2000 with poverty incidence 
at 67.1 and 63.2 percent, 35.0 and 56.5 percent; 41.6 and 55.1 percent; 55.6 and 55.0 
percent; and 36.6 and 54.3 percent respectively.68  
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In terms of indicators in living conditions and provision of social infrastructure, 
ARMM and western Mindanao need special attention. They have the lowest access to 
safe drinking water, electricity, and toilet and health facilities. Moreover, Mindanao 
has the lowest share of the country’s health practitioners and visit rates of health 
personnel. Such deplorable state is reflected in the island’s high crude death rates with 
ARMM having the highest at 9.8 deaths per 1000 people.69 In the simple literacy 
index, ARMM had the lowest in 1994 at 73.5 percent when national average is 94 
percent.70 Although participation rate71 for public and private schools at the secondary 
level showed modest improvements for school years covering 1997–2000, cohort 
survival72 rates are lowest in ARMM and other conflict-ridden areas of Mindanao. 
The state of human conditions is thus summarized in Philippines’ Human 
Development Index. The 1997 and 2000 figures reveal that eight out of 10 provinces 
which registered lowest are in Mindanao with six of them largely inhabited by 
Muslims: Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Basilan, Maguindanao, Lanao del Sur, and Lanao del 
Norte.73  
In virtually all measures of physical and socio-economic well-being, the ARMM 
is found at or near the bottom of the national rankings. The Mindanaoans, relative to 
their counterparts in Luzon and Visayas, have the lowest per capita incomes, largest 
poverty incidence, and least access to physical and social infrastructure as well as 
basic services despite the teeming resources of their lands and seas. The people, most 
especially the minority Muslims and other non-Muslim/non-Christian peoples, have 
yet to benefit from their natural and human wealth. 
The marginalization of Mindanaoans in general and Muslims in particular from 
the orbit of Philippine development is historically rooted in the colonial and post-
colonial land settlement and migration policy which gradually dispossessed Muslims 
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and other indigenous peoples of Mindanao of their traditional and ancestral lands. The 
accelerated influx of Christians from Luzon and Visayas in the “land of promise” 
particularly in the post-colonial period did not only change the demographics of 
Mindanao but also altered the concept of land ownership.  
The institutionalization of the state’s Torrens titling system, which recognizes 
individual land ownership, contradicted the traditional concept of communal 
ownership observed and practiced by Muslim and other indigenous communities. The 
state’s recognition of individual land ownership, evidenced by one’s possession of a 
Torrens Land Title, thus tended to favor Christian settlers who were more literate and 
adept in using the law to their advantage compared to Muslim and non-Christian/non-
Muslim who were ignorant of the laws and incapable of using the legal processes 
involved in land titling apart from the exorbitant cost it required.74 Moreover, it is an 
anathema to people’s culture to have an ancestral land, owned collectively, to be 
parceled and titled individually to members of the tribe. 
The inability of most Muslims and other ethnic groups to claim individual 
ownership over lands they held since time immemorial through the Torrens Land Title 
virtually rendered them “squatters” in their own domain. More enterprising Christian 
settlers and business corporations exploited Muslim and other indigenous peoples’ 
ignorance of the law by collaborating with officials of government engaged in land 
titling by declaring individual or corporate land ownership of ancestral lands by way 
of “manufactured” Torrens land titles. While some wealthy migrants and private 
corporations (both local and multinational) took advantage of people’s financial 
difficulties by pressuring them to sell their lands to the former at extremely low prices 
compared to the current market price, others simply confiscated lands traditionally 
held by people either by force or display of a “land title” of dubious origin. The 
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corporate intrusions in Mindanao contributed to the massive dislocation and 
displacement of Muslims and indigenous peoples alike.75  
Muslims of southern Philippines have been victims of economic development. 
The wealth of their lands and seas has not been transformed in peoples’ material 
development and progress. These were simply siphoned out of their homelands that 
served the economic interests not only of Christian settlers but also of foreign 
multinational corporations. The political order seen as the structure that breeds 
economic deprivation and social discrimination became one of the rallying causes of 
some Muslim leaders to undertake the process of self-governance outside of the 
Philippine system of political administration.  
The socio-economic conditions certainly continue to worsen as population 
increase naturally exerts more pressures on the capacity of traditional sources of 
revenue and livelihood such as the land, rivers, lakes, and seas within reach of the 
inadequate local technologies and crafts. As with separatist movements elsewhere, 
ordinary Philippine Muslims are most likely to fight for or support an armed separatist 
organization when they are faced with no alternative means to survive the persisting 
discrimination and worsening living conditions.  
Perceived discrimination, injustice, and alienation 
Finally, beyond economic and political grievances, the issue of separatism is one of 
subjective feelings, of perceptions, and of language—that Muslim minorities are 
being “summarily discriminated and exploited by the Christian majorities”—
reminiscent of the Spanish period when the former colonizer drove the wedge 
between the Christianized indios and “non-believers” (Moros and other tribal groups). 
Christian prejudices against Muslims were created by the Spanish colonial state as 
part of its “divide-and-rule” policy. Biases against Muslims were then widespread and 
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accentuated with the regular performances of “Moro-Moro,” a theatrical play that 
enacts the defeat of Muslim “villains” in the hands of Christian “heroes,”76 during 
Christians’ celebration of fiestas.77 This folk-theatre survived until the 1950s whose 
repercussions reverberate until now. 
The dominant Christian community has not really obliterated the lingering anti-
Muslim preconception in their consciousness as the name “Moro” designates the 
shared identity for Philippine Muslims that categorically and pejoratively associated 
with piracy, savagery, treachery, and other negative connotations. On the other hand, 
Muslims have kept in their collective memory the innumerable cases when native 
converts were conscripted to fight the Moros in the interest of the Spanish Crown and 
the Church. The same policy continued during the American colonial regime, though 
to a limited extent.  
On the other hand, the MNLF and MILF, notwithstanding their ideological 
differences—the former as more secular while the latter being more Islamic—see 
themselves as “one people” bound collectively on the basis of a common ancestry, 
history, society, institutions, territory, and more importantly, religion. As the minority 
people in a predominantly Christian nation, they perceive themselves as the 
marginalized, persecuted, and powerless people both politically and economically. 
Regardless of organizational affiliation, independence remains the underlying essence 
of political autonomy for Muslim socio-politico movements.  
In the recent conflict, historical and predetermined mutual feeling of bigotry and 
prejudice of Christians and Muslims has oftentimes been used by political leaders to 
engender or strengthen people’s identity in the competition for power and resources. 
And when conflicts escalate, perceptions and languages are distorted within the 
warring parties. The distortions are partly spontaneous and partly organized to rally 
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the people to engage in warfare, bear the economic burdens, and face the human 
misery of war. Conceivably, when war breaks out, truth is its first victim.  
For instance, the alienation of Muslims and other ethnics (non-Muslim and non-
Christian tribes) from their homelands due to acts of outright land grabbing of 
Christian migrants and private corporations has embedded upon their consciousness 
the inability of government not only in protecting their economic well-being but also 
in acting on behalf of the Christians in gradually eroding their identity by allowing 
them to be driven away from their lands, considered as the repository of their culture. 
This notion subsequently precipitated and crystallized into the secessionist movement 
as a cause against Christian aggression.78  
Moreover, the conflictual situation arises when state’s nationalist policies 
exercised through the institutionalization undue political centralism and unitary 
policies are perceived to be discriminatory and threatening to minority groups’ socio-
cultural, economic, and political interests. The violent reaction of ethnic minorities 
against these policies is comprehensible as they endanger their collective survival. 
Accordingly, the undertaking to secede from the state becomes an inescapable 
recourse on the contention that separatists do not see a fair chance that their 
fundamental aspiration and interest, i.e., to be a part of the nation, would be hitherto 
accommodated under the state’s political system.  
Given the aforesaid politico-administrative, economic, and cultural causes of the 
Bangsamoro self-determination movement, it is apparent that the crucial immediate 
issue is one of participatory rather than secessionist rights.  
 
Conclusion 
This article has argued that the state-Moro conflict is sparked and protracted more by 
the centralism of the state and inadequate democratic space that limits the self-
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governing power of the minorities, particularly the Muslims in southern Philippines. 
The tenacity and seriousness of the conflict remains complicated with the unremitting 
inability of the state to substantially and decisively address, over a long period, its 
core causes insubstantial political autonomy; socio-economic grievances and 
deprivation; and perceived injustice, discrimination, and alienation of the people from 
the mainstream of Philippine political and economic development. The issue boils 
down to political and economic equity and social justice, the crux of the state’s 
responsibility and kernel of nation’s spirit.  
It is essential therefore that Moros be drawn within the domain of the state and 
make them feel that they are part and foremost stakeholder of the Philippine nation. 
Although ethnic identities and affinities can serve as one’s refuge when the primordial 
culture of Moros is threatened by the state’s domineering power, the sense of Moros’ 
separateness as a people can be altered or modified. Perceptions are neither fixed nor 
permanent. They change as material conditions change; identities and communal 
interests also change and are equally malleable and pliant as they interact with the 
power of the state. A dialectical relationship exists between one’s perceptions and the 
actual situation or socio-economic and political setting where one belongs. 
Perceptions and conditions do influence and transform each other.  
As discussed earlier in the article, the multi-ethnic character of the Moro struggle 
for political autonomy indicates that national identity of the Moros will be primarily 
contingent on the ability of Moro leaders to transcend the limits of organizational and 
ethno-linguistic loyalties. The less than orthodox practice of Islam among Moros in 
the Philippines signifies the high probability of creating a Bangsa Moro in a 
consensual and harmonious manner between and among contending Moro 
organizations. 
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Yet, the process of reversing such outlooks and feelings of alienation and 
transcending ethnic boundaries also demand a strategic approach of sustained and 
indefatigable efforts and commitment on the part of the state towards greater 
democratisation, meeting the new challenges of mosaic democracy and heterogeneous 
development. It requires the state to redefine itself and adopt an institutional 
framework of governance that would allow the expression of democracy in 
kaleidoscopic forms.  
State’s nation-building and centralization of power to the nation-state, indeed, 
resulted in the deprivation of ethnic communities to decide for themselves and the 
power to govern in accordance with their ideals and aspirations. Obviously, the 
meaning of democracy is violated when minority groups79 lack any reasonable chance 
to take part in the policy-making process in government on a more or less permanent 
basis without suffering from the “tyranny of the majority.” In other words, the rule of 
the majority or “majoritarian democracy” in deeply divided societies is likely to be 
profoundly undemocratic. 
Since the post-colonial years the unitary state has worked towards the integration, 
assimilation, and transformation of multiple ethnic identities into a single national 
identity—a downward exertion of state nationalism. The nationalism of the state is 
materialized through the assimilation and integration of minorities into the majority’s 
culture, system of governance, and socio-economic structure. This tends to destroy 
minority rights and cultures even when there is no conscious intent to do so. State 
nationalism is henceforth resisted by those groups who do not see themselves as part 
of the Philippine nation. They feel strongly against the erosion of their self-identity 
and see it as a gross violation of their political, economic, and cultural rights.  
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It is the contention of this article that the threat of national disintegration will 
continue until an appropriate institutional framework for political governance which 
can accommodate Mindanao’s social and ethnic diversity is ensconced. Apart from re-
engineering political institutions in Mindanao, there is a need to lay emphasis, at least 
at the local level, on good governance, the rule of law, improved civil-military 
relations, accountability of public officials for corruption, and human rights 
protection. These efforts would, to a large extent, facilitate the early conclusion of 
conflict, accelerate the process of peace, and find a respectable and honorable final 
peace agreement between contending forces. More importantly, steps toward this 
direction would not only strengthen the Philippine nation-state but also considerably 
extirpate the cause of secessionism.  
Whether or not the state would be able to meet the challenges of nation-building 
and national unity is difficult to surmise at this point. Definitely, there will be no 
quick fixes and no shortcuts. Wounds that have festered for a long time cannot be 
healed overnight, nor can confidence be built or dialogue developed while fresh 
wounds are being inflicted. It is a process that requires special and extra effort on the 
part of the state to guarantee human rights and uphold the rights of people to their 
own development.  
In as much as conflict is created in one’s mind, peace can likewise be a product 
of one’s mind. One of the critical elements therefore in conflict resolution is the 
conscious construction of a positive outlook towards building a new and better 
relationship to an erstwhile archenemy. The courage in seeking to come to terms with 
the past is an essential part of the search for a new way forward. 
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